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Modernity and the idea of progress
Angelos Mouzakitis*
Sociology, University of Crete, Rethymnon, Crete, Greece
This paper aims to show the centrality the concept of progress occupies explicitly and 
implicitly in social theory, in relation to the theorization and understanding of modernity; 
it also raises the question whether in times where Eurocentrism, logocentrism, and 
indeed almost every claim of supremacy are rightly viewed with suspicion, it is possible 
to think of modernity without relying on some interpretation of the notion of progress. 
Arguably, the theme of progress, together with the complementary notion of decline, can 
be considered as a key-component of discourses concerning modernity and has played 
a major role in the shaping of social theory. Comte and Durkheim relied in different ways 
in the idea of progress and the same holds for Marxist accounts of social change. Even 
later, sociological theories address modernity from the perspective of progress, Parsons 
being exemplary in this respect. Moreover, theoretical discourses adopting a critical or 
even hostile attitude against the modern project often question the idea of progress and 
are woven around the representation of modernity in terms of decline and regression 
into unreason, as, e.g., Adorno and Horkheimer’s Dialectic of Enightment. Arguably, the 
imagery of progress informs the distinction between society and community, which is 
also hidden behind Habermas’s more recent theorization of societies in terms of systems 
and lifeworlds. Finally, the question regarding the possibility of partially disentangling the 
theorization of modernity from the idea of progress is pursued via a critical assessment 
of Eisenstadt’s multiple modernities and Wagner’s theorization of modernity in terms of 
responses given to basic problématiques.
Keywords: modernity, progress/decline, social change, critique of reason, community/society, system/lifeworld
introdUCtion
Peter Wagner expresses a widely shared view when he writes that modernity “has always been 
associated with progress” (Wagner, 2012, p. 28), since belief in endless progress is often identified 
as one of the main characteristics of the Enlightenment (see Wagner, 2016). Arguably, the word 
“association” must have been carefully employed by this author in this context with the aim to avoid 
any strong claims concerning the possible identity between modernity and conceptions of progress, 
while pointing at the same time to a certain non-accidental congruence between the two “terms.”
However, there is little doubt that the idea of “an immanent and indefinite progress” that gradually 
replaced the medieval belief in providence is inextricable woven with modernity, as it emerged in the 
midst of the querelle des anciens et des modernes in philosophy and the arts and subsequently spread 
out to embrace various aspects of European societies. Löwith claims that this new belief in progress, 
which almost became “a religion,” would be impossible without the questioning of the dogma of 
divine providence but ironically in gradually replacing it also had to assume its function, viz. it 
had to “foresee and to provide for the future” (Löwith, 1949, p. 60). Therefore, the idea of progress 
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that—together with the concept of revolution—shaped the hori-
zon of historical expectations in the early stages of modernity and 
gave birth to the genre of the philosophy of history, exemplified in 
its very origins an ambivalence toward the medieval conception 
of the world, being “Christian by derivation” and “anti-Christian 
by implication” as Löwith (1949) observes (p. 61). It is equally 
apparent that currently, grand narratives of progress seem 
rather unpopular and redundant, but this hardly means that all 
notions of progress are irrelevant to late modern societies or to 
our attempts to understand present forms of modernity, as Peter 
Wagner rightly observes in the forward to his last contribution to 
the problem of progress (Wagner, 2016).
Arguably, conceptions of progress can be traced in different 
aspects of discourses about modernity, ranging from everyday 
conceptions and stereotypes about the “modern condition” to 
slightly paraphrase Lyotard—and sociological or philosophical 
accounts of modernity. It is however only with the latter that I am 
going to deal in this short excursion on progress. In what follows 
I do not attempt to provide an exhaustive account of the various 
phases the idea of progress underwent between the eighteenth 
century and the present, as this would require a separate study1 
(Nisbet, 1994). Instead, I focus on the transference of the notion 
of progress from the field of the philosophy of history to that of 
social theory and the impact of progress to the wider theorizing 
of social change. I then move on to consider the ways in which 
the entanglement of the imagery of progress with modernity has 
shaped core dichotomies in social theory, such as those between 
community/society and systems/lifeworlds. Finally, I turn my 
gaze to the ways in which the belief in progress that underlined 
modernization theories has been challenged by Eisenstadt’s 
multiple modernities approach and to the prospects opened up 
by Wagner’s more recent attempts to theorize the relationship 
between progress and current modern projects.
tHe pHiLosopHy oF History
On the level of theoretical discourses that explicitly or implicitly 
tackle the problems of modernity, an often unacknowledged com-
mitment to some notion of progress is traceable at first sight in 
various accounts of social change. This is hardly surprising, given 
the elective affinities between the “scientific” endeavor character-
istic of early sociology to discover the mechanisms underlying 
socio-historical change and the field of the philosophy of history, 
where an explicit link between progress and historical change first 
emerged, partly as a result of the development of the concept of 
“world history” as well as the conception of “humanity” as the 
at-once singular/collective subject of history.2 One can always 
1 An extended—and scholarly—presentation of this sort can be found in the second 
part of Nisbet’s History of the Idea of Progress, and especially in chapters six and 
seven (Nisbet, 1994).
2 Indeed, the critique of the very conception of universal history entails that the 
concept of humanity also became the object of critique. However, despite the 
fragmentation of human beings, groups, civilizations, and whole socio-historical 
formations, I believe the concept is still indispensable at least as a regulative 
principle, as Ricoeur proposed in his exchange with Castoriadis in 1985, or as an 
imaginary signification as Castoriadis proposed in the same context (Castoriadis 
and Ricoeur, 2016, p. 66–68).
distinguish of course between “weaker” conceptions of progress 
as in Kant’s Idea of a Universal History and more radical ones as in 
Hegel’s Phenomenology and Lectures on the Philosophy of History 
as well as in Marx and Engels and in some versions of Marxism. 
Indeed, a good number of Marx’s own writings seem to support 
the idea that Marx was himself to an extent under the spell of 
the widespread belief in progress. Although it is impossible to 
do justice here to the variety and richness of the responses from 
friends and foes to Marx’s works in relation to the problem of 
progress, it would be unwise to completely refrain from highlight-
ing some aspects of it.
It looks like until the Second World War, quite a few Marxists 
felt comfortable with the notion of progress. Thus, in his attempt 
to define “orthodox” Marxism in his classic work History and 
Class Consciousness, Lucaks still saw no fault in claiming that “by 
adopting the progressive part of the Hegelian Method” Marx was 
able to reveal “the real substratum of historical evolution” (Lucaks, 
1972, p. 17-emphasis added). Some decades later, Hannah Arendt 
arguing from a completely different intellectual perspective criti-
cally observes that in Marx’s “dream of a classless society…does 
a last, though utopian, trace of the eighteenth century concept [of 
progress] appear” (Arendt, 1973, p. 143).
However, even from the early twentieth century, Marxists of 
sorts have also attempted to trace in Marx’s works non-determin-
ist elements and in general have questioned the very notion of 
necessary historical development. Balibar (1995) presents us with 
a fine example of this attitude as he argues that Marx’s works are 
Janus-faced. According to Balibar in texts like The Communist 
Manifesto, The German Ideology, the “introduction” of 1859 to The 
Critique of Political Economy and the first volume of The Capital 
Marx appears as a thinker that gave a specific interpretative twist 
to the theme of progress, addressing it from the perspective of the 
economy. This aspect of Marx’s writings is therefore for Balibar 
(1995) marred by—mainly economic—determinism and final-
ism, despite the fact that Marx envisaged a state-of-affairs that 
would ultimately break with the logic of historical development, 
i.e., the classless society that would signify the emergence of his-
tory proper, i.e., history qua freedom (p. 94).
However, Balibar thinks he can still trace a non-determinist 
Marx that focuses on historicity and in human practice rather 
than on universal historical trends, in reading between the 
lines of Marx’s major works cited above and in light of some 
remarks contained in his Critique of the Gotha Program and his 
correspondence with Vera Zasulich. Balibar even claims that by 
“an astonishing turnabout,” Marx’s “economism gave birth to its 
opposite: a set of anti-evolutionist hypotheses” (Balibar, 1995, 
p. 108). In any case, even if we accept Balibar’s argument, Marx 
presents us with a limit-case of a thinker who was both fascinated 
with the mixture of positivist and progressive accounts of his times 
and had an intimation of intellectual developments that were yet 
to emerge. Or, in yet another formulation, on the one hand, Marx 
appears as “the supreme rebel against bourgeois liberal thought” 
and on the other hand Marx “accepted universalism in so far as 
he accepted the idea of an inevitable historical march toward 
progress” (Wallerstein, 1991, p. 125).
Arguably, the development of the idea of progress in modernity 
was shaped to a certain extent by the combination of medieval 
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eschatology and the emergence of expectations made possible 
by a host of unprecedented changes in science and political, 
economic and social institutions. Indeed, Koselleck claims that 
this combination produced a temporality, which could open up 
to the future without limit, thereby making possible the very idea 
of universal history (see Koselleck, 2004, p. 140, 232). Of great 
importance is Koselleck’s insight that progress was not “simply an 
ideological mode of viewing the future” but that it “corresponded, 
rather to a new everyday experience which was fed continually 
from a number of sources,” such as the developments of tech-
nical civilization and the rapid changes of social and political 
institutions (Koselleck, 2004, p. 60). Now it has to be noted that 
although the meaning of the concept of ideology remains largely 
ambivalent,3 we should certainly take care not to treat the idea 
of progress as epiphenomenon. In this sense, progress should 
be best understood as an “imaginary social signification” in the 
sense that Castoriadis gives to this concept, viz. as a signification 
that is neither limited to the perceived (real) or to the consciously 
thought, but stemming from the unconscious forms the unac-
knowledged ground of collective and individual practices and 
actions (see, e.g., Castoriadis, 1987, esp. chapters 3, 4, 7; for a 
detailed discussion of the concept, see Arnason, 2014).
Alternatively, we could treat progress as a key element of what 
Taylor calls “social imaginary,” viz. a pre-theoretical, relatively 
structured manner of understanding the world, shared by large 
social groups or even whole social formations, informing prac-
tices and granting legitimacy to actions and institutions4 (see, e.g., 
Taylor, 2007, p. 172–173).
Fukuyama traces the emergence of the specifically modern 
conception of progress on the writings of Machiavelli and 
especially in what he understands as a decoupling of politics and 
3 The problem is quite complex to adequately discuss it here. Suffice it to say that 
a host of developments in epistemology and the theory of knowledge in the 
twentieth century render the class-laden and clear-cut conception of ideology as 
distorted consciousness propounded by Marxism rather untenable. Mannheim’s 
treatment of ideology and utopia as an inseparable couplet and the abolition of the 
distinction between truth and ideological distortion in favor of an understanding 
of knowledge as relational (with the exception of mathematics and the natural 
sciences) and always already linked to specific Weltanschauungen bound to social
groups (see Burger and Luckmann, 1971, p. 21–22), the so-called linguistic turn, 
phenomenology’s insistence on the lifeworld as the ground of scientific discourses, 
Foucault’s treatment of the couplet episteme/science and the linking of meaning 
with “discursive formations” in his two major epistemological works, are but few 
instances of the challenges to the customary understanding of ideology. This does 
not make the concept of ideology redundant, for such an attitude would cancel 
any claims to truth and would render impossible the very foundation of reason, 
viz. its critical function. We are just compelled to try to establish a more subtle 
understanding of ideology as an inescapable element of the hermeneutic condi-
tion, or as Ricoeur puts it, once we have rejected the possibility of a total view of 
the social world, we have to cultivate our “practical wisdom” in the knowledge that 
we “cannot get out of the circle of ideology and utopia” and to use critical reason 
to turn this circle into a “spiral” (Ricoeur, 1986, p. 314).
4 At least two significant authors refer to progress in terms that seemingly contradict 
my attempt to address it as something much more complex than an easily refuted 
superstition. Arendt (1973) (p. 144) describes progress as superstition and Balibar 
(1995) as ideology. However, in my understanding, Arendt’s overall analysis suggests 
that she does not treat it like an epiphenomenon and the same holds for Balibar, 
who using “Canguilhem’s terminology” links evolutionism as “scientific ideology” 
with the emergence of a “site of exchange between scientific research programmes 
and the theoretical and social imaginary” (Balibar, 1995, p. 91-emphasis added).
morality in Machiavelli’s works. The same author traces impor-
tant formulations of progress in the writings of Enlightenment 
thinkers like Voltaire, the encyclopedists and Condorcet, but 
suggests that it is with the emergence of German Idealism that 
the notion was given the most thorough and “serious” treatment 
(Fukuyama, 1992, p. 57). Arguably, within German Idealism, 
progress was seen primarily in terms of the gradual attainment 
of truth as in Kant’s ideal of gradual Enlightenment and Hegel’s 
conception of (absolute) spirit.
Kant has been often considered as providing us with a moder-
ate and yet somehow canonical conception of the Enlightenment 
and of the theme of progress in history. In his treatment of Kant’s 
writings that directly or indirectly deal with the problem of pro-
gress and history, Honneth discerns three distinct modes under 
which Kant tackled this issue. The first such version is arguably 
largely dependent on Rousseau’s view of civilization and therefore 
woven around the concept of “unsocial sociability” and the need 
for recognition from one’s social environment (Honneth, 2009, 
p. 12). The second version postulates that social conflict in the 
guise of the constant threat of war and the perpetual attempts to 
put an end to conflict provide the main mechanism of progress in 
history (Honneth, 2009, p. 13).
In Honneth’s view, both versions mentioned above rely on 
the assumption that a common teleology bridges the natural and 
the human realms and it is only with the third version that the 
specifically human domain is seen as relatively independent of 
natural teleology. As he puts it, the third version envisages nature 
only as the “origin of a specific human capacity…and not as the 
original cause of a plan that concerns us” (Honneth, 2009, p. 14). 
At first glance Kant’s third formulation might look less important 
than it really is. Honneth traces therein the insight that human 
intelligence and “the mechanism of learning” is established as the 
key-mechanism of progress both ontogenetically and phyloge-
netically and claims that there are similarities between Kant’s and 
Hegel’s treatment of progress; in his view, they both understand 
historical processes in terms of “directed progress,” with the cru-
cial difference that Kant did not rely to the “anonymous process 
of an unfolding of spirit” (Honneth, 2009, p. 17).
In a fashion that arguably brings him quite close to Habermas’s 
understanding of the role of the public sphere and his theory 
concerning the emergence and development of communica-
tive rationality, Honneth argues that it is only this last version 
of Kant’s treatment of history that is viable and “fruitful for the 
present,” since all those who “actively side with the moral achieve-
ments of the Enlightenment” are now to understand history as “a 
conflict-ridden learning process” and themselves as “heirs” of this 
process and therefore as responsible for the continuation of this 
development “in their own time” (Honneth, 2009, p. 18).
Now, I believe that we could add some elements to this insight 
without violating Honneth’s intentions and insights. First, it has 
to be noted that we could always interpret Hegel’s immanent tel-
eology—and his treatment of absolute spirit—as relatively open. 
In this case, the elective affinities between Kant’s and Hegel’s 
versions of human freedom and historical progress become more 
pronounced. In this respect, it is certainly no accident that Rose 
who argues that in “Hegel’s thought ‘spirit’ means the structure of 
recognition or misrecognition in a society” and is “inseparable 
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from absolute spirit, the meaning of history as a whole,” is able 
to trace parallels between Kant’s moral judgment and Hegel’s 
absolute ethical life (Rose, 1981, p. 41, 45).
Second, the idea of interrupted historical progress that is 
relatively independent of nature opens up a whole field of inves-
tigation into the ever-changing relations between the human and 
non-human forms of development. It should be noted in passing 
that in my view, of the various answers given to this problem the 
most promising one is Castoriadis’s. According to Castoriadis 
society is characterized by a twofold indeterminacy: on the one 
hand in leaning on the “first natural substratum” society is rela-
tively independent from what we usually call natural laws and on 
the other hand in being developed around magma-like social sig-
nifications, institutions resist the kind of explanation that is based 
on what Castoriadis calls “identitary” (formal-mathematical) 
logic (see Castoriadis, 1987, esp. chapter 5; Clooger, 2014 shows 
how Castoriadis’s critique of ensemblistic-identitary logic is in 
effect a focused and profound critique of reason).
A third point concerns the simple observation that any progress 
through learning could never be only contemplative in nature. 
Rather, any attained “truth” was to be embodied in institutions 
and thereof to promote both collective and individual autonomy, 
despite the all too often felt tension between the individual, 
the particular and the universal that Hegel sought to reconcile 
through his conception of the modern state. It goes without say-
ing that this identification of truth, progress, and modernity was 
also met with resistance, the most acute moment of which in the 
nineteenth century is arguably to be found in Nietzsce’s relegation 
of the status of truth to that of “metaphor” and his subsequent 
double assault on the idea of progress in history via the metaphor 
of the “eternal return of the same” in Thus Spoke Zaratustra and 
the postulation of the existence of retrogressive forces as founding 
instances and pillars of the Judeo-Christian civilization and of 
European modernity in The Genealogy of Morals.
soCiaL tHeory and soCiaL CHanGe
However, to the extent that challenges to the Enlightenment-
inspired dominant discourse on progress remained relatively 
limited and marginal, the imaginary of progress did not fail 
to capture sociological imagination ever since the inception 
of the discipline. Auguste Comte, this “partisan of order as 
well as progress” (Wernick, 2001, p. 10), thought that he had 
grasped the “law of the three stages” that the human spirit of 
necessity had to undergo in its development and he postulated 
relevant transformations in the domain of whole societies and 
institutions.
Nisbet has shown that in regard of his commitment to the 
idea that “human history has been linear, that it has progressed 
in stages or epochs, and that it resembles nothing so much as the 
intellectual development of a single individual,” Comte is in fact 
a typical representative of his times and the heir of a conception 
that emerged in Roman Antiquity and later “seized and made the 
key to world history by St. Augustine” (Nisbet, 1994, p. 255). As 
we know, Comte’s ill-fated conception (apparently an early and 
somehow clumsy attempt at a sociology of knowledge) was met 
with suspicion or even outward rejection ever since Durkheim 
saw as his task to purge sociology from Comte’s metaphysics.5 
The same suspicion was directed against Herbert Spencer’s 
evolutionism, arguably yet another Darwin-inspired guise under 
which the “imaginary signification” of progress was addressed in 
the early days of sociology and which was pronounced over and 
done with by Talcott Parsons in his first major work The Structure 
of Social Action,6 although in a strike of irony Parsons himself 
came to adopt a quasi-evolutionary perspective of social change 
in his later works, expressed most notably in his 1964 article 
“Evolutionary Universals in Society” (Parsons, 1964).
Interestingly, Parsonian sociology was accused of promoting 
an a-historical view of society that allegedly hindered any sub-
stantial analysis of social change.7 In his 1968 postscript to The 
Civilizing Process, Elias gives an interesting interpretative twist to 
this criticism against structural functionalism. Indeed, he argues 
that with the introduction of the concept of “pattern variables” 
and especially with the couplet “affecivity vs affective neutrality,” 
Parsons re-interprets Tönnies’s distinction between Gemeinschaft 
and Gesellaschaft. In this reading of the Parsonian oeuvre, com-
munity is characterized by affectivity and society by affective 
neutrality. Elias argues further that by introducing highly abstract 
concepts like these, Parsons theorizes social change as if it was a 
“card game” and remains insensitive to the “distinguishing pecu-
liarities” of historically specific societies (Elias, 2000, p. 453–454). 
According to Elias, Parsons uses concepts like “ego” and “system” 
in a reified manner that reproduces Durkheim’s allegedly erro-
neous  assumption that the “relation between ‘individual’ and 
5 Comte’s positivist epistemology was however also heavily reliant on the idea of 
progress, as the “idea of the progressive filiation of the sciences is crucial to his 
strategy” (Nisbet, 1994, p. 254). Although it is impossible to adequately treat the 
place progress holds in the history of epistemology and of science in the context 
of this brief discussion, some comments on the issue are still in place. Positivism 
in general gave progress a central position as it assumed that scientific knowledge 
was cumulative and progressive. However, late Wittgenstein, Kuhn, and others 
contributed in undermining this conception. Indeed, both Wagner (2016) (p. 27) 
and Feyerabend emphasize the role of Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific revolutions in 
disrupting the positivist understanding of knowledge, while Feyerabend focuses 
specifically on the importance of incommensurability, a notion employed by Kuhn 
and himself, for the undermining of what he calls the quantitative (or strong) 
conception of scientific progress (Feyerabend, 1987, p. 156). However, interpreta-
tions being often unpredictable, one should note that Kuhh’s work has been used 
by Campbell in the opposite direction, viz. so as to make feasible an “operational 
sense of progress together with an evolutionary epistemology” (Dancy and Sosa, 
2000, p. 271–272).
6 See for example the opening statements of The Structure, where Spencer is declared 
“Dead by suicide at the hands of person or persons unknown,” together with the 
positivist–utilitarianist tradition that according to Parsons he represents. Indeed, 
Parsons goes as far as to suggest that the reason of Spencer’s fall from grace is none 
else but his adherence to the principles of evolution and progress (Parsons, 1949, 
p. 3–4). However, some scholars have discerned a commitment to progress even in 
this early work of Parsons. Indeed, they argue that Parsons ultimately holds in The 
Structure “a relatively unilinear notion of historical progress,” while he is blind to 
the contradiction between “his critique of evolutionist constructions of history à la 
Spencer and his own interpretation of intellectual history with its implicit belief in 
progress” (Hans and Knöbl, 2009, p. 48–49).
7 Alexander observes that the initial criticism against Parsons in relation to social 
change was the erroneous assumption that he lacked any theory of systemic change. 
However, later and “in response to the voluminous scholarly writing on differ-
entiation,” this critique gave way to the opposite but equally unjustified critical 
assumption that the “functionalist approach to change is, in fact, overly systemic” 
(Alexander, 1978, p. 183–184).
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‘society’ is an ‘interpenetration’ of the individual and the social 
system” (Elias, 2000, p. 456). It is this treatment of concepts that in 
Elias’s view leads Parsons astray and is responsible for his reduc-
ing “processes to states” (Elias, 2000, p. 456).
However, in relation to progress, there are two important ele-
ments in Elias’s criticism of Parsons. First, although Elias writes 
the postscript at a date when Parsons had already explicitly 
published works that focus on the theme of evolution there is no 
mentioning of this issue in the postscript. Instead, his critique 
is but a variation of the mainstream critique against structural-
functionalism, which it accuses of holding an “Eleatic” view of 
society as it assumes that “societies are usually to be found in a 
state of equilibrium” (Elias, 2000, p. 459). Second, Elias’s critique 
of Parsons is followed by the quite interesting suggestion that 
Parsons’s alleged blindness to social change8 is a result of a total 
rejection of the theme of social development, a concept that Elias 
uses in this context as almost synonymous to progress. Indeed, 
Elias argues that this is part of a wider decline of the theme of 
development in the social sciences that in his view should be 
attributed to the contamination of nineteenth century accounts 
of social development such as those of Comte, Spencer, Marx, 
and Hobhouse by “political and philosophical ideals” (Elias, 2000, 
p. 458). Against that idealization of progress, the “nation” pro-
vided in Elias’s interpretation of twentieth century mainstream 
social theory the equally ideological imagery of an unalterable 
substance that served as a model for structuralist–functionalist 
accounts (Elias, 2000, p. 462–463).
It has to be noted in this context that throughout this text 
Elias seems to hold the view that the social sciences should not 
altogether refrain from using the concept of development, or the 
waning “belief in progress,” but that they rather have to purge 
it from ideological elements and ground their analysis on facts 
(Elias, 2000, p. 458, 461, 467). Leaving aside the epistemological 
difficulties this claim entails, it should be noted that it is perhaps 
this attitude that led some readers of his works to see Elias’s 
treatment of civilization as evolutionism in disguise as Van 
Krieken (1998) observes (p. 66). This is in my view a blatant 
misunderstanding of Elias intentions, since he clearly under-
stands civilization as a precarious and unfinished process, always 
threatened by counter-civilizing processes,9 like the “decivizing 
spurt of the Hitler epoch” (Elias, 1996, p. 1) as he writes in the 
introduction to The Germans. At the same time though, I cannot 
but agree with Van Krieken (1998) that there operates in Elias’s 
work a  conviction that modern societies have actually developed 
8 It is possible that Parsons’s famous statement in The Social System that “a general 
theory of the processes of change of social systems is not possible in the present state of 
knowledge” (Parsons, 1991, p. 327), combined with the overall emphasis he placed 
on the notion of systemic equilibrium has led to this misinterpretation of his stance 
towards social change.
9 Smith observes that in contrast to Hannah Arendt who understands decivilizing 
processes and Nazism in particular “as involving a tightening of controls,” Elias 
describes National Socialism “in terms of a breakdown of controls” (Smith, 2001, 
p. 62), or we could add as a regression in the development of the German Habitus. 
In this respect, it is certainly no accident that Elias argues that it is “no figure of 
speech but a simple statement of fact to say that Hitler in Germany had a function 
and characteristics similar to those of a rainmaker, a witch doctor, a shaman in 
simpler tribal groupings” (Elias, 1996, p. 388).
or progressed in some aspects and in a non-linear manner (like 
in science and in the extended application of self-control) in 
relation to medieval ones (p. 67). In any case, it is strange that 
Elias neglects altogether to comment on the clearly evolutionist 
character of Parsons’s later theories.
Indeed, in his later works, Parsons envisages the existence of 
“evolutionary universals,” i.e., elements “sufficiently important 
to further [socio-cultural] evolution,” while he argues that social 
organization through kinship, communication with language, 
religion, and technology form an indispensable and “integrated 
set of evolutionary universals at even the earliest human level” 
(Parsons, 339, 342). In another work of the same period, 
Parsons clearly addresses the problem of social change from an 
evolutionary perspective, arguing that sociocultural “evolution 
has proceeded by variation and differentiation from simple to 
progressively more complex forms,” although he also insists 
on the plural and non-linear character of this development 
(Parsons, 1966, p. 2). It is this assumption that both operates 
behind his fundamental tripartite classification of historical 
societies as “primitive (sic) intermediate and modern,” and 
informs his claim that modernity has its single historical origin 
in the “societies of Western Europe as they developed from the 
medieval base, which emerged after the decline of the Roman 
Empire” (Parsons, 1966, p. 3).
A response to evolutionism came in the late 1960s from Robert 
Nisbet (1969), who argued against evolutionary conceptions of 
social change that he rightly attributed to both sociological and 
philosophical accounts, although his argument can be extended 
so as to include interpretations of social change that rely heavily 
on the idea of progress. Put in a nutshell, Nisbet’s argument is that 
social theory and philosophy suffer from an unjustifiable—and 
ultimately ideological—conception of social change in terms of 
passage from allegedly lower (traditional) forms of societal life 
to allegedly higher ones in modernity. Importantly, he attributes 
the tendency of modern thought to theorize social change in this 
rather simplistic manner, to an interpretation that was—perhaps 
accidentally—given in modern times to the Greek conception 
of growth and decay in combination with the Aristotelian con-
ception of entelecheia, i.e., the inner principle allegedly guiding 
every being toward its end or its perfection. Nisbet argues that the 
concept of entelecheia was reinterpreted both in the context of the 
Christian tradition through the writings of Saint Augustine and in 
the modern, secular philosophical, and sociological accounts of 
social change that tend to address this phenomenon as a process 
immanent to society and in this respect in terms of a necessary 
development. Nisbet also argues that the most exemplary form of 
this interpretation is to be found in functionalist and structuralist 
sociological accounts, in the context of which it also results in the 
hypostasization/essentialization of “society” as such.
CoMMUnity/soCiety
As already implied in the discussion above, the idea of progress is 
also hidden behind the celebrated dichotomy between commu-
nity and society (Gemeischaft and Gesellschaft), which was so dear 
to early sociologists. Far from being just an imagery informing 
Ferdinand Tönnies’s homonymous work, this simple opposition 
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can arguably be discerned in various guises (or even in disguise) 
in a series of sociological discourses on the social, ranging from 
Max Weber’s ideal-typical juxtaposition between “traditional” 
and “modern”/“rational” forms of social (inter) action and 
association in his Economy and Society, to Durkheim’s postula-
tion of two forms/modes of solidarity (mechanical and organic) 
corresponding to pre-modern and modern societal formations. 
In both cases of course, the inferences are far from direct.
Weber’s understanding of modernity in terms of ration-
alization and disenchantment is a far cry from a celebration of 
progress as his “Stahlhartes Gehäuse10” or “iron cage” thesis in 
the Protestant Ethic clearly shows (see Weber, 1992, p. 123). This 
holds insofar as this thesis expresses a great concern—if not 
outright distaste (see Giddens, 1992, p. xix)—for the impact of 
the specific forms of rationalization characteristic of European 
modernity in institutions and individuals alike. However, in 
spite of the rather unresolved tension between the unmistak-
able marks of Nietzsche’s influence in Weber’s interpretation of 
modernity and his endorsement of the methodological principle 
of value-neutrality as a prerequisite of the sociological enterprise, 
the eminence Weber attributes to rational action might not be 
accidental. In other words, as Weber’s methodological atomism 
has been attributed to an unacknowledged commitment on his 
part to the modern Weltanschauung concerning individuality 
(see Löwith, 1993, p. 61), so it is possible that his ideal-typical 
typology of action bears subtle imprints of a shared understand-
ing of modernity as progressive in terms of rationality in relation 
to pre-modern forms of societal organization.
A similar observation can be made in relation to Durkheim’s 
conception of modernity and of social change. Although 
Durkheim intentionally reverses the meaning the terms “organic” 
and “mechanical” originally held in Tönnies’s work, at bottom, 
the conception regarding the progressive character of modern 
societies in comparison to pre-modern ones remains intact in his 
conception, if it is not even more pronounced than in Tönnies’s 
case. Durkheim theorizes modernity—and social change—in 
terms of passage(s) from states-of-affairs that fall under the 
category of “mechanical solidarity” to states-of-affairs that are 
mostly characterized by “organic solidarity,” i.e., with forms of 
social life that are compatible with a higher sense of individuality. 
Müller rightly observes that Durkheim’s use of the term solidarity 
should be understood as an attempt to cast a “relational” concept 
that would adequately grasp the nature of the social bond and give 
an answer to the problem of social order. Mechanical solidarity 
10 Baehr argues that Parsons violated the meaning of this phrase when he chose to 
translate it as “iron cage” instead of “shell as hard as steel” as Baehr (2002) himself 
proposes (p. 200). In Baehr’s interpretation of the Protestant Ethic, this phrase 
would best capture Weber’s quasi-Nietzschean insight concerning a radical shift in 
the human condition, the emergence in modernity of some unprecedented mode 
of passivity of humans vis-à-vis their own creations. Baehr rightly observes that 
although Weber did not partake in the “parody” of kulrurpessimismus that was 
quite popular at his times, he was still troubled and “disconsolate about the human 
prospect” at least with regard to the Occident (Baehr, 2002, p. 197). It should be 
noted, however, that the concept of Stahlhartes Gehäuse does not simply signify the 
coercive elements of rationalization, since “its unparalleled rational and technical 
efficiency provided the essential services and goods of mass consumption” that few 
modern individuals “would willingly” dismiss (Gosh, 2014, p. 389).
thus describes a form of direct integration of the individual in 
community, while organic solidarity expresses integration via 
increasing differentiation of both the levels of individual exist-
ence and the collective representations than become much more 
complex than in simple and archaic forms of societies (Müller, 
1994, p. 79).
Now this could be—and has been—interpreted in different 
ways. Nisbet argues that Durkheim was one of the few intellec-
tuals of his generation that resisted the idea of moral progress, 
but he also stresses the purposive use on Durkheim’s part of 
Tönnis’s distinction between Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft, his 
adherence to the theses of “social atomization” and “seculariza-
tion” (Nisbet, 1965, p. 18, 21–22). However, at the other end of 
the spectrum of possible interpretations, the precarious—and 
perhaps even deceptive—character of this distinction has been 
rightly highlighted by Jean-Luc Nancy in his celebrated collection 
of articles bearing the telling title The Innoperative Community. 
In this work, Nancy argues against the allegedly fictive character 
of the distinction as he remarks that “community has not taken 
place…or rather…community has never taken place along the 
lines of our projections of it,” and consequently no “Gesellschaft 
has come along to help the State, industry, and capital dissolve a 
prior Gemeinschaft” (Nancy, 1991, p. 11).
Moreover, the entanglement between the idea of progress and 
the imagery of the passage from community to society could also 
be discerned in the functionalist conception of social change 
in terms of (social) complexity and (systemic) differentiation.11 
Providing at the same breath an account and a self-understanding 
of modernity, this fundamental differentiation between com-
munity and society essentially informs even more recent and 
more sophisticated approaches, such as Habermas’s Theory of 
Communicative Action, where a main differentiation is drawn 
between systems and communicative lifeworld(s).
The possibility of multi-dimensional lifeworlds was already 
acknowledged in Alfred Schutz’s classic The Phenomenology of 
the Social World, where it is clearly stated that the lifeworld is 
open to differing and perhaps conflicting interpretations, and 
the author offers the “examples” of the magical interpretation 
pertaining to simple societies, the theological interpretation of 
the sort propagated by a religious missionary and the scientific 
one corresponding to the modern scientist (Schutz, 1966, p. 270). 
Apart from bearing some uncanny similarities with Comte’s 
“law of three stages,” Schutz’s conception here seems to be 
premised on the belief that lifeworlds are in a process of gradual 
11 Wagner points out that the notion of functional differentiation emerged as an 
interpretation of the ideal of progress and it helped suppress criticism on economic 
and epistemic practices, which under this principle appeared both necessary and 
justified (Wagner, 2016, p. 40). Being premised on the notions of difference and 
rupture, Luhmann’s version of systems theory is arguably less evidently linked with 
the idea of progress. However, the concept of autopoiesis goes glove in hand with 
the concept of higher or emergent systemic orders, while the openness of autopoi-
etic systems entails that the formation of systems-environments is a process that 
in principle may take place ad infinitum. The fact that in Luhmann’s formulation 
there are no stable “elements” or system units and that the relation between system 
and environment is indeterminate (Luhmann, 1995, p. 22–23) makes the theory 
much more interesting than the Parsonian approach, but changes little concerning 
the issue discussed here.
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rationalization, a thesis associated with the writings of Max 
Weber but clearly presented and defended by Habermas in the 
Theory of Communicative Action (see also Wagner, 2016, p. 88).
systeMs and LiFeWorLds
Habermas attributes both ontological and epistemological 
primacy to the lifeworld, which he treats as the original locus 
of social interaction and as the foundation of systemic forms of 
social development (see Joas, 1991, p. 114). He is therefore at 
pains to establish beyond doubt the—allegedly historically con-
firmed—thesis of the gradual rationalization of the lifeworld, in 
an attempt to provide at the same time a comprehensive argument 
concerning the mechanisms of social change, a grounding of his 
concept of “communicative rationality” and of the autonomy of 
Reason over against its various distortions that in his view are the 
outcome of system-related interests.
It is well known that Habermas treats the lifeword as a concept 
that counters the notion of the “transcendental subject,” and 
consequently as the exemplary “transcendental” locus of com-
municative exchanges (and interactions) between more or less 
rational agents and as the place where mutual agreement is to be 
sought and social consensus could ideally be attained (Habermas, 
1987, p. 126–127). He furthermore maintains that seen from 
the “inner” perspective of agents, the lifeworld is a concept that 
presents elective affinities with Durkheim’s concept of “collective 
consciousness” (Habermas, 1987, p. 133). In this sense, the life-
world forms the meaningful horizon within which agents live and 
interact and on which rest both the meaningful orientation of their 
individual actions and the overall vestige with meaning of whole 
societal formations. Like an horizon proper, the lifeworld cannot 
itself become a theme of the subject’s consciousness (Habermas, 
1987, p. 124) and consequently its various objectifications (like 
for example in cases of forms of culture, etc.) only reveal aspects 
of its overall structure. Habermas’s argument is way too complex 
to be dealt with in detail here, it is however important to note that 
despite acknowledging the impact intricate interactions between 
competent but possibly non-expert (or lay) agents has on the very 
outlook and structure of specific lifeworlds, he still believes that 
overall the structural and morphological transformations of life-
worlds can be interpreted as a process of gradual transformation 
of “the sacred into language.”
This conception, which again reproduces one of Durkheim’s 
most celebrated distinctions (i.e., that between the sacred and 
the secular), arguably identifies the “sacred” with the “ineffable” 
(in the sense of something quasi-mythical, imaginary but non-
yet explicitly linguistically expressed) and the secular with the 
linguistically mediated and gradually developed rationality. In 
Habermas’s view, the internal differentiation of the lifeworld 
results in the proliferation of “regions,” where interaction takes 
place under conditions of a mutual orientation toward under-
standing and where the attainment of consensus depends on the 
principle of the “best argument” (Habermas, 1987, p. 145).
This formulation entails a double defense of the autonomy of 
reason against the criticisms of the first generation of the Frankfurt 
School and especially against the celebrated thesis of The Dialectic 
of Enlightenment (a reversal itself of the Hegelian and Marxian 
version of dialectics), and according to which far from reaching an 
Absolute self-clarity (as in Hegel) or a fully emancipated state-of 
affairs (as in Marx), “enlightened” reason (the Ratio) of necessity 
relapses to myth and unreason as it follows an inconclusive and 
vicious dialectic. The Dialectic of Enlightenment is a fine example 
of theoretical discourses criticizing the idea of modernity as pro-
gress, which—unlike other critiques of modernity as for example 
Spengler’s Decline of western Civilization—retains a certain com-
mitment to the ideals of human emancipation and reason,12 while 
tending to interpret modernity from the perspective of regression 
(though not of decay).
In this respect, on the one hand, Habermas’s conception of 
gradually rationalized lifeworlds stands in stark contrast to 
Adorno and Horkheimer’s (Adorno and Horkheimer, 1986) 
argument13 that enlightened reason is essentially instrumental 
and quasi-mythical, since Habermas claims that through com-
municative actions myth is in the last instance gradually replaced 
by reason on the very soil on which myth itself first emerged, viz. 
in the lifeworld.
Habermas offers a telling example when he claims that we can 
discern symbolic elements and rituals in archaic forms of society, 
but although these archaic, mythical forms of understanding are 
crucial for the emergence and maintenance of social integration, 
they merely inform social behavior, not action proper. Rather, 
he explicitly states that only through the “transformation of 
primitive (sic) systems of calls into grammatically regulated, 
propositionally differentiated speech was the sociocultural point 
reached at which ritualized behavior changed into ritualized 
action” and that from that point on “we no longer have to be 
content with describing ritualized behavior [but] we can try to 
understand rituals” (Habermas, 1987, p. 190). In other words, this 
largely fictive—but perhaps heuristically fruitful—postulation 
of a major transformation in the midst of mythical representa-
tions of the world reproduces the widely shared conviction that 
reason has myth as its foundation and that human action is only 
conceivable as such under conditions of relative rationalization. 
It follows that our attempts to “understand” action in the man-
ner of the Weberian Verstehendesoziologie are only conceivable 
under conditions of some emergent form of rationality—the 
reinterpretation on Habermas’s part of Weber’s typology of 
action—and especially of Weber’s conviction that “emotional” 
and “traditional” actions are not actions proper, being in my view 
more than evident here.
12 According to Alexander, an extreme example of the critique of reason is presented 
in the writings of Sorel, who “faced with the disappointment of his socialist hopes 
for progress” came to propound the idea “that individuals are not as rational as 
progressive theory had thought.” Indeed, he even attempted to establish “a com-
monality between modern actors and the myth worshipers of traditional societies” 
and wavered himself “between revolutionary left and right” (Alexander, 1990, p. 
22).
13 Habermas claims that in The Dialectic of Enlightenment Horkheimer and Adorno 
“play a variation on the well-known theme of Max Weber, who sees the ancient, 
disenchanted gods rising from their graves in the guise of depersonalized forces 
to resume the irreconcilable struggles between the demons” (Habermas, 1990, p. 
110). Importantly, Habermas also sees the central thesis of the Dialectic as equally 
perilous or “no less risky than Nietzsche’s similarly posed diagnosis of nihilism” 
(Habermas, 1990, p. 110).
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On the other hand, Habermas traces a direct link between the 
distortive elements of reason (the so-called instrumental rational-
ity) and systemically grounded interests. In this sense, he attempts 
to differentiate between a non-distorted, communicative form of 
rationality emerging progressively out of the development of the 
lifeworld(s) and a potentially alienating form of rationality gener-
ated by systemic differentiation and the proliferation of systems. 
In other words, he claims that these ideal-typical representations 
of societies (i.e., system and lifeworld) undergo a series of changes 
that he calls the gradual “uncoupling of systems and lifeworld” 
(Habermas, 1987, p. 153), and which results in the perilous 
“colonization” of the lifeword by systemic interests under the 
influence of media like money and power, i.e., in the progressive 
technicization and instrumentalization of the lifeworld’s symbolic 
structures (e.g., Habermas, 1987, p. 183, 187, 196).
Habermas’s critique of systems follows his earlier attempts to 
come up with a critique of instrumental reason without denying 
altogether the emancipatory powers of reason and science, to be 
found most notably in his Reason and Human Interests. It can 
also be interpreted as a critique of the so-called “modernization 
theories” based on models of economic growth (rather than 
development), since Habermas treats economic systems largely 
as obstacles to the attainment of social consensus on the grounds 
of undistorted communication.
proGress and pLUraLity: Beyond 
MULtipLe Modernities?
A further critique of modernization theories was advanced by 
Shmuel Eisenstadt’s “multiple modernities” approach, which 
was based on a reinterpretation of Karl Jaspers’s “axial age” 
thesis. Ironically, Eisenstadt’s writings in the 1950s still pre-
sented but “an unorthodox version” of modernization theories 
and his most prominent work in the 1960s, his comparative 
study of World Empires, was conducted within the theoretical 
framework of Parsons’s systems theory. Arnason observes that 
this prevented Eisenstadt from making the most out of the 
diversity of his material, since the imposition of “predicated 
on an evolution from simple to complex societies” prevented 
him from completing his critique of modernization accounts 
(Arnason, 2015, p. 148–149).
No single work of Eisenstadt adequately develops the theoreti-
cal framework of his later work that came to be known as “multiple 
modernities” and which Arnason describes as a “cultural turn” in 
Eisensatdt’s approach to socio-historical phenomena. However, 
his break with the Parsonian paradigm is attributed to at least two 
main factors: First, Eisenstadt was increasingly convinced that the 
state of Israel presented the unique manifestation of the modern 
project. Second, this insight was further enriched by Eisenstadt’s 
reinterpretation of Karl Jaspers’s “axial age” thesis and the concept 
of “axial civilizations” (Arnason, 2015, p. 165–166).
According to the “multiple modernities” approach, the great 
Eurasian civilizations of the first millenium (700–400) B.C.E, i.e., 
of the “axial age,” shared the emergence of certain characteristics 
that mark the passage from pre-history to history and are still rel-
evant today. The most important elements are the differentiation 
between the “sacred” and the “secular” spheres and the emergence 
in some cases of the first “world religions,” the emergence of 
reflexivity (and philosophy), a primal understanding of human 
historicity and the acknowledgment of human agency as a crucial 
historical factor, or as Wagner puts it, the acknowledgment that 
“a different world is possible” (Wagner, 2005, p. 93; Wittrock, 
2005, p. 61 ff.). The merit of this approach is that it attempts to 
address modernity under a pluralistic perspective, as a history of 
continuous processes of formation and transformation of what 
Eisenstadt (2000) calls “cultural programmes,” a term coined 
to substitute for the notions of “civilizations” and “societies” (p. 
2). Therefore, it resists both the urge to theorize modernity in 
one-dimensional manner (say as conditioned by developments 
in the economy) and to some extent the tendency to understand 
modernity through the over-simplistic conception of the pas-
sage14 from medieval times to modern ones.
Eisensatdt understands modernity as a “distinct civilization 
with distinct institutional and cultural characteristics,” as a “crys-
tallization” of “modes of interpretation of the world,” or as form-
ing a distinct social imaginary, as he writes following Castoriadis 
(Eisenstadt, 2002, p. 28).
The multiple modernities approach is explicitly directed 
against Fukuyama’s assumption concerning the alleged lack 
of alternatives to the established socio-economic and political 
institutions of capitalism that became popular under the rubric of 
the “end of history.” It was also consciously developed against the 
Samuel P. Huntington’s conflict-laden interpretation of western 
and non-western civilizations (Eisenstadt, 2002, p. 27). In this 
respect, it challenges to a considerable degree the assumption that 
social change could be theorized in general from the standpoint 
of progress or evolution and that this progress is represented by 
the specific progression of cultural, social, scientific, economic, 
and political institutions in the western world. However, it has 
been also pointed out that the idea of an almost “direct” link 
between the axial age and our “present era” is rather unsustainable 
(Wagner, 2012, p. 156), while the very emphasis of the “multiple 
modernities” approach to reflexivity, historicity, and agency could 
be seen as uncritically reproducing mainstream conceptions of 
modernity (Wagner, 2005, p. 104).
In response to these problems, Wagner has proposed in his 
Modernity as Experience and Interpretation (Wagner, 2008) and 
in his subsequent works to study modernity from the perspective 
of at least three fundamental problématiques (viz. the epistemic, 
the political, and the economic) without privileging a priori any 
of them and secondly, to substitute of the term “improvement 
over time” for the notion of “progress” (Wagner, 2012, p. 151). In 
the same vein, he proposes to avoid if possible the overburdened 
with meaning terms “society” and “civilization” and to replace 
them with more fluid and indeterminate notion of “collective 
self-understanding” (Wagner, 2012, p. 158). Wagner’s proposal 
is interesting as far as our often misleading concepts of society, 
14 It is worth noticing that Wallerstein adds some significant remarks to this critical 
point, even as he writes from a quite distinct theoretical perspective to that of 
multiple modernities. Indeed, Wallerstein links the very notion of “transition” 
to the fallacious idea that “history is progressive, and inevitably so” and to the 
tendency of the social sciences to study what he calls “historical systems” under 
the theoretical pattern of “linear transformations” (Wallerstein, 1987, p. 322–323).
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civilization, and progress are concerned, but a lot of conceptual 
labor is required before we could feel content with the ways in 
which the very impasses resulting by the modern and contem-
porary understandings of collectivity, subjectivity, and identity 
could be overcome. In effect, the notion of “improvement over 
time” has the merit that it retains a “weak” ideal of progress while 
attempting to break with the commitment to the idea of imma-
nent development and entelecheia in the sense discussed above. 
The same goes for Wagner’s attempt to substitute the notion of 
“physical human beings” for the more conventional notion of the 
“subject,” although it has to be noted that the proposed term is 
no more tangible and no less metaphysical than the alternatives, 
while it presupposes a great deal of groundwork on key concepts 
like the body, the self, being, etc. before we could possibly use it 
in a satisfactory manner.
However, the indisputable merit of Wagner’s aforementioned 
proposal is that it thematizes the problems generated by the link 
between conceptions of modernity and the idea of progress, it 
provides us with alternative ways of theorizing modernity and in 
so doing it also shows the possible inescapability of the question 
of progress. The link between modernity and progress becomes 
certainly less visible in discourses that extrapolate a radical 
discontinuity between modernity and post-modernity like in 
Lyotard’s The Postmodern Condition15 that drew on and extended 
“the earlier thesis about post-industrial society” and emphasized 
“the impact of new information and communication technolo-
gies” (Wagner, 2015, p. 107), or with discourses that attempt to 
altogether deconstruct western metaphysics and consequently 
also the modern preoccupation with progress. However, in their 
origins, deconstructive discourses often fail to resist the tempta-
tion to exaggerate the aspect of decline,16 as in Nietzsche’s assump-
tion that counter-creative forms of power were constituent of the 
nineteenth Century European civilization, or Heidegger’s claim 
that technology forms the ultimate horizon of western metaphys-
ics, barring alternative manifestations of common and individual 
being.17
Since at least 2008, Wagner’s works have increasingly pen-
etrated the thorny question of progress and his last published 
15 Lytotard argues that in postmodernity grand narratives have lost their legiti-
mation: “The grand narrative has lost its credibility, regardless of what mode of 
unification it uses, regardless of whether it is a speculative narrative or a narrative 
of emancipation” (Lyotard, 1984, p. 37).
16 Expectedly, interpretations on this issue vary. Nehamas for example argues that 
we miss the ambivalence of Nietzsche’s attitude towards modernity if we simply 
see it in terms of the theme that Alan Bloom described as the decline of the West 
(Nehamas, 1996, p. 223, 245). In any case, even a more moderate interpretation of 
these philosophers’ attitudes towards modernity, could hardly miss a crucial aspect 
of their—otherwise divergent—philosophical projects. Indeed, it is indisputable 
that Nietzsche and Heidegger “distance themselves from the foundational claims 
of the Enlightenment” and in so doing, they also “abandon the notion of ‘critical 
overcoming’ so central to the Enlightenment critique of dogma” (Giddens, 1991, 
p. 47). This means though that their works have also contributed at least to a 
radicalization of the questioning of the very idea of progress.
17 This claim is quite clearly formulated in the following sentence: “The threat to 
man does not come in the first instance from the potentially lethal machines and 
apparatus of technology. The actual threat has already afflicted man in his essence. 
The rule of enframing threatens man with the possibility that it could be denied 
to him to enter into a more original revealing and hence to experience the call of a 
more primordial truth” (Heidegger, 1993, p. 333).
book on the issue (2016) is such a response, an attempt to inhabit 
the space opened up between the extreme faith in progress of 
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and the disillusionment 
with progress that characterizes much of the twentieth century 
and the present. Wagner acknowledges the different dimensions 
of progress and the variety of interpretations historically given 
to this notion, as well as what—following Gadamer18—we could 
call the “problem of application,” i.e., the fact that there is always 
a dynamic between interpretation and putting a “concept into 
practice” (Wagner, 2016, p. 10). Indeed, in order to do justice to 
this complex constellation of meanings, practices, institutions, 
societal and political formations and individuals, he examines his 
material in accordance with the three problématiques mentioned 
above (Wagner, 2016, p. 13–14).
Wagner argues that a common “mechanism” operates behind 
conceptions, imageries, practices, and institutional advance-
ments in relation to progress in the fields of science/knowledge 
and the economy, where the imaginary signification of “mastery” 
seems to accompany that of progress (Wagner, 2016, p. 38). In 
this respect, Wagner’s reconstructive project is quite influenced 
by Castoriadis’s well-known thesis that modernity is grounded 
on two—often conflicting but also entangled—core imaginary 
significations, viz. the unlimited expansion of “rational mastery” 
and political “autonomy” (Castoriadis, 1997, p. 37).
In my understanding of Wagner’s work, this influence by 
Castoriadis’s interpretation of autonomy accounts for the specific 
emphasis placed on the political problématique19 and for his 
insight that “one key concern of our time should be political 
progress” in the sense of a “radical commitment to democratic 
18 In his most prominent work, Truth and Method, Gadamer reinstates the moment 
of application as one of the constitutive moments of the event of understanding. 
He therefore argues that “historical hermeneutics too has the task of application 
to perform, because it too serves applicable meaning, in that it explicitly and con-
sciously bridges the temporal distance that separates the interpreter from the text 
and overcomes the alienation of meaning that the text has undergone” (Gadamer, 
1989, p. 311).
19 The impact of progress on the shaping of political discourses is immense and 
impossible to adequately discuss in the context of this brief excursus. However, it 
should be noted that even after the disenchantment with “progress” that gradually 
befell western societies during the 1980s the social imaginary is still fueled by 
interpretations of this concept in many respects. Right-wing and populist move-
ments have exploited the idea of progress at least in two different ways. First, they 
used the widespread social dissatisfaction and fragmentation of post-industrial 
societies to attack basic democratic principles. Second, right-wing parties came 
up with their own appropriations of progress, as is evident in the case of the 
extreme right-wing Progress Parties in Denmark and Norway (Betz, 1994). The 
picture becomes much more complex if we take into account the argument that 
postindustrial societies have undergone a “silent” shift towards post-material 
values such as “cosmopolitanism and multiculturalism” and to political relevant 
skills, mainly endorsed by left-wing parties and leftist social movements (Inglegart 
and Norris, 2016, p. 3; Ingelhart, 1977, p. 3, 43–45) and that in this respect much 
of right-wing rhetoric revolves around the attempt to undermine these values. Of 
course, the disenchantment with progress was not merely reflected in right-wing 
political parties, as for example the Green Party in Germany built its identity in 
opposition to the notion of economic and technical progress that was part of the 
agenda of the established parties in West Germany at that time (Betz, 1991, p. 82). It 
goes without saying that in countries with different cultural economic and political 
background from Europe and the USA like South Africa, Brazil, etc. “Progress” 
has been also appropriated in a constructive manner to enhance democratic rights 
(Wagner, 2016, p. 62).
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agency” (Wagner, 2016, p. 21). Wagner casts this insight in 
various other ways, as for example in terms of the need to both 
acknowledge and actively rekindle what he calls “historical 
temporality.” Temporality here signifies the acknowledgment of 
the always dynamic and precarious of the social-historical, or a 
state-of-affairs characterized by a tension between “abstract and 
‘presentist’ concepts of the individual and the collectivity” and 
the various actual experiences of “domination and injustice” 
(Wagner, 2016, p. 128).
Here again, Wagner uses the experiences gained by the vari-
ous “protest” social movements that emerged in the 1960s and 
stresses the need to renegotiate social and political forms of pro-
gress, while avoiding the extremities of what he calls “hybristic 
projects of radical transformation” without however rejecting 
also any kernel of truth they might possess (Wagner, 2016, p. 
103, 150–152). Indeed, if “critique and protest” fuel the search for 
“normatively superior solutions,” then Wagner is right in placing 
great emphasis in the role of protest movements, such as the anti-
colonial movement, the feminist movement, and the movement 
against the apartheid in South Africa in the reinterpretation of the 
notion of progress and in the dissolution of organized modernity 
(Wagner, 2016, p. 108–115).
Put in a nutshell, Wagner identifies the main “mechanism” 
of progress from mid-eighteenth century to the last part of 
the twentieth century to be domination and resistance to 
domination, and he insists that the notion of progress should 
not be altogether rejected but that it should rather be replaced 
with a relative conception of progress through a reworking of 
the Enlightenment idea of collective and personal autonomy 
(Wagner, 2016, p. 152).
soMe ConCLUdinG reMarKs
“There is no want in our age of declarations by historians and other 
intellectuals that the idea of progress ‘died with Herbert Spencer,’ 
‘ended with the nineteenth century,’ and was ‘banished forever by 
World War I’…But the truth lies elsewhere,” writes Nisbet in 1980 
and goes on to argue that in spite of the abundance and variety of 
challenges to the idea of progress in the twentieth century, “the 
dogma of progress isn’t at death’s door” (Nisbet, 1994, p. 297). 
Almost 30 years later and despite the worldwide proliferation of 
such challenges in the present, progress and decline are arguably 
hardly extinguished from the imaginary of contemporary phi-
losophy and science as this brief essay attempted to show.
Since I was primarily interested in showing the ways in which 
the theme of progress has shaped social theory and especially 
theories of social change, only indirectly—and in passing—did I 
address the normative aspect of the relation between the various 
projects that could be characterized in some way as “modern” 
and progress. It is, however, evident that much of the discussion 
concerning the inescapability of the question of progress points 
exactly to the need to further clarify this dimension. Admittedly, 
this is a quite complex issue that involves a thorough discussion 
of many contemporary currents of thought, while it involves 
important epistemological and philosophical issues to which 
one should dedicate a separate study. In this respect, Wagner’s 
approach is quite promising in directly focusing on the theme of 
progress and in showing from yet another perspective the need 
for a reinterpretation of the “project” of the Enlightenment. It was 
clear to Nisbet and it is perhaps even clearer today that a naïve, 
unqualified belief in progress is unsustainable. At the same time, 
we need to take heed of Wagner’s insight that a total rejection of 
the notion of progress might prove perilous for the social and 
political future of the world, or of Nisbet’s claim that “in its oldest 
and broadest,” the idea of progress “has been associated more 
often with good than with evil” (Nisbet, 1994, p. 318).
Irrespective of whether we understand the origins of progress 
to lie in Greco-Roman Antiquity (Nisbet, 1994, p. 11), or if we 
address it as a uniquely modern imagery, it is very difficult to 
completely dissociate the multiple forms of modernity from 
progress. Indeed, progress presents us with yet novel challenges 
both on the level of theory and on the various other dimensions of 
the social world(s), challenges to which we have to respond. The 
various critiques of reason and social developments worldwide 
have clearly undermined the belief in the universality of reason, 
making any attempt at reinterpretation of the basic tenets of the 
Enlightenment and of reason both precarious and necessary.
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